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This paper reports the results of a study of three successive IT outsourcing
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11. Introduction
“Risk is a choice rather than a fate”
Peter Bernstein [9, p.8]
Bernstein’s history of man’s effort to understand risk begins with the following question : “What
is it that distinguishes the thousands of years of history from what we think of as modern times?”
to which the following answer is provided : “The revolutionary idea that defines the boundary
between modern times and the past is the mastery of risk : the notion that the future is more than
a whim of the gods, and that men and women are not passive before nature” [9, p.1]. The
question and its answer could be transposed to the context of the management of Information
Technology (IT) outsourcing. While, a decade ago, firms considering to outsource their IT
activities were often portrayed as facing numerous and important risks against which little could
be done [14], there are now examples that show that these risks can be managed [4].
Using a risk management framework advanced by Aubert et al. [4], this paper reports the results
of a study of three successive IT outsourcing contracts at British Petroleum (BP). The paper
illustrates how risk management and learning can eventually transform risk into a “choice” rather
than a “fate”.
The paper first defines the notions of IT outsourcing risk and risk management and describes the
methodology adopted to conduct the study. It then describes each of the three BP IT outsourcing
contracts, along with an assessment of respective risk level and an analysis of how risk was
managed in each case. Finally, a transversal analysis of the three contracts is conducted in order
to contrast and compare them.
2. IT outsourcing risk and risk management
March and Shapira define risk from two broad perspectives: the economic perspective and the
managerial perspective [20]. The economic perspective defines risk as the variance of the
probability distribution of possible gains and losses associated with a particular alternative [5].
The managerial perspective considers the notion of risk differently [20]. Managers do not equate
the risk of an alternative with the variance of the probability distribution of possible outcomes,
and they do not treat uncertainty about positive outcomes as an important aspect of risk. Rather,
to them, the potential positive outcomes constitute the attractiveness of an alternative, while risk
is associated with its negative outcomes. That is, risk is perceived as a "danger or hazard". March
and Shapira also emphasize the fact that, to managers, the magnitude of the loss due to a negative
outcome is salient.
In order to take into account these two aspects of the managerial perspective, the risk
management model advanced by Aubert et al. [5] adopts the notion of risk exposure, which is
defined as a function of the probability of a negative outcome and the importance of the loss due
to the occurrence of this outcome :
2Risk Exposure = P(NO) * L(NO)
where P(NO) is the probability of a negative outcome, and L(NO) the loss due to the outcome.
The loss due to a given undesirable outcome can be approximated either via quantitative analysis
or via qualitative assessment [7, 25]. In certain circumstances, the probability of occurrence of an
undesirable outcome can be estimated on the basis of the past performance of the object under
study [19]. However, in several areas such an assessment is almost impossible to perform [7].
Consequently, several risk assessment methods approximate the probability of an undesirable
outcome by identifying and assessing the characteristics of a situation that are likely to influence
the occurrence of the outcome [2, 7, 10]. These characteristics are labeled risk factors. This
approach was adopted by Aubert et al. [5] who reviewed the IS and the industrial organization
literature, and listed the most often cited undesirable outcomes of IT outsourcing, as well as their
related risk factors. For the purpose of the present study, these lists were revised and updated (see
Table 1).
The objective of risk management is to reduce the level of risk exposure. Aubert et al.’s [4] risk
management framework defines four generic risk management strategies. The first strategy
focuses on reducing the importance of the loss related to the occurrence of an undesirable
outcome. Mechanisms – such as insurance, incentive contracts, bonds and warrants -which
transfer to third parties the costs of coping with undesirable consequences belong to this strategy.
The second strategy is the mirror image of the first : it refers to all measures aimed at reducing
the probability of an undesirable outcome. This can be achieved by modifying the value of the
risk factors – for example, carefully choosing the activities to be outsourced so as to reduce
measurement problems or cautiously selecting suppliers with respect to their financial stability
and experience with the outsourced activities. The third strategy calls for a mix of mechanisms
from the two previous strategies, aimed at either reducing the likelihood of occurrence of
undesirable outcomes or their consequences. Finally, the fourth strategy is a monitoring strategy,
well suited to situations in which both the probability of occurrence and the losses are relatively
small. Applying this strategy consists in periodically reassessing the level of risk exposure in
order to determine if it has remained the same and making sure that all the “standard safeguards”
are well in place.
3. Methodology
In order to better understand the components of risk and the dynamics of risk management, a case
study was conducted. The company chosen, British Petroleum, has extensive outsourcing
experience, significant contracts, and a history of risk evaluation and management. The company
employs more than 50,000 people and conducts worldwide activities. Three contracts were
analyzed. The first one, labeled BPX, involved the outsourcing of IT activities linked to BP
Exploration division. This contract was widely publicized [11]. The second contract – BPCC -
was awarded a short time after BPX and included the Head Office IT needs. Finally, the BP
Global contract concerns the whole IT organization (head office and divisions).
3Table 1
Components of risk exposure of IT outsourcing
Undesirable outcomes
Unexpected transition and management costs [11,13,22]
Factors leading to outcome :
• Lack of experience and expertise of the client with the activity [13,17]
• Lack of experience of the client with outsourcing [13]
• Uncertainty about the legal environment
Switching costs (including lock-in, repatriation and transfer to another supplier) [23]
Factors leading to outcome :
• Asset specificity [15,28]
• Small number of suppliers[21]
• Scope
• Interdependence of activities
Costly contractual amendments [13]
Factors leading to outcome :
• Uncertainty [1,8]
• Technological discontinuity [17]
• Task complexity
Disputes and litigation [6,16]
Factors leading to outcome :
• Measurement problems [1, 8]
• Lack of experience and expertise of the client and/or of the supplier with outsourcing contracts
[13, 17]
• Uncertainty about the legal environment
• Poor cultural fit
Service debasement [6,16]
Factors leading to outcome :
• Interdependence of activities [5,18]
• Lack of experience and expertise of the supplier with the activity [13]
• Supplier size [13]
• Supplier financial stability [13]
• Measurement problems [1, 8]
• Task complexity
Cost escalation [16,17]
Factors leading to outcome :
• Lack of experience and expertise of the client with contract management [13, 17]
• Measurement problems [1, 8]
• Lack of experience and expertise of the supplier with the activity [13]
Loss of organizational competencies [12,13,16,27]
Factors leading to outcome :
• Scope
• Proximity of the core competencies [24]
• Interdependence of activities
4Data about the first contract were obtained from a journal article [11], internal documents
produced by BP about the lessons learned from the contract, and interviews with BP managers.
The BPCC contract was documented using internal documentation and interviews. Finally, the
third contract, which was being negotiated at the time of data collection, was documented
through interviews, internal presentations and records of meetings pertaining to the contract.
Approximately fifteen managers were interviewed. These were mostly managers from IT,
involved in the first decisions and who had to manage the contracts afterward. These managers
were also involved in the negotiation and risk analysis of the BP global contract. Some users –
from UK and the USA - were also interviewed.
Using the data gathered on the three contracts, the researchers assessed the risk level of each, by
rating the risk factors and the undesirable outcomes listed in Table 1. The impact of each
outcome was assessed on a 1 (very low) to 7 (very high) scale. Then, the probability of
occurrence of each outcome was approximated (on a 1 to 7 scale) by first evaluating each of the
risk factors associated with the outcome and then by aggregating the values of all the factors. The
following section presents a brief description of each contract.
4. Three successive IT outsourcing contracts
BPX contract.
This was BP’s first major outsourcing venture. The project covered data centre management,
telecommunications, maintenance, and systems development. It was intended to cover all BP
Exploration (BPX) offices around the globe, in eight major sites and 42 businesses. BPX
contracted with an alliance of three suppliers. The project included a global agreement to cover
the general principles and objectives of the outsourcing arrangement, which each party signed,
and site-specific contracts to cover specific deliverables. A major objective of the framework was
to ensure that the suppliers would act as a single “virtual supplier.” Seamless service was a
priority. In spite of each contractor’s area of expertise, for each of the company’s major business
sites, one supplier would serve as the primary contractor and coordinate the services provided by
the other two.
Risk exposure and risk management. Risk exposure was quite high, since most of the risk
factors were present to a rather high level, and the impacts of the negative consequences were
also high.
Hidden service costs was the major threat in this case (6.7,6 on Figure 1). Because of the extent
of the contracts, and the large number of activities outsourced, hidden service costs could be very
high (6). All three factors associated with this outcome - complexity of the outsourced activities,
measurement problems, and uncertainty - were high at the outset. First, the task was very
complex (6). Not only did it include all BPX IT related activities, it also included all its
worldwide locations. Given the nature of the activity, measurement problems are important (7).
Finally, since BPX knew its needs would change in the future but was not sure what these needs
would be, uncertainty was high (7).
5Providing each supplier with a clear area of responsibilities, according to their expertise, partly
decreased the value of the complexity of the task assigned to each supplier (4). To decrease the
level of uncertainty, BPX decided on limited term contracts which would enable it to change
technology solutions to match its business needs within a reasonable time frame. BPX also tried
to reduce the likelihood that its uncertain future needs would not be met by selecting suppliers for
their innovative and entrepreneurial abilities and by including expectations of best practices
adoption and flexibility in the contracts (5). The general framework agreement enabled BPX to
renegotiate its site performance contracts annually. Thus, the company could redefine the
measures it used during the life of the general contract, hence reducing the amplitude of
measurement problems (4).
Disputes and litigations, costly contractual amendments, and loss of organizational competencies
were next in order of importance in terms of risk exposure (6,5).
Figure 1 BPX contract
Potential disputes and litigations were evaluated thoroughly. During supplier selection, BPX
realized its original idea of trying to strictly enforce seamless service between multiple suppliers
through contracts was probably not possible. It recognised that disagreements would probably
arise between the suppliers and that they might then turn to BPX for adjudication (6). The related
risk factors are measurement problems, uncertainty about the legal environment, and poor
cultural fit. The importance of measurement problems was discussed earlier. Late in the contract
finalisation process, BPX uncovered a problem which it hadn’t considered previously. European
antitrust laws prevented the three suppliers from joining in a formal alliance as originally
planned. This increased the likelihood that the suppliers would not be able to work together as
planned. Instead of all three suppliers forming an alliance to work with BPX, the company was
required to sign separate agreements with each. Thus, the legal environment restricted the
supplier’s capacity to do the job BPX needed done (4). Poor cultural fit, that is, not being able to
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6work well together was seen as one of the biggest risk factors when developing this contract (6).
A poor fit would increase the risk that the company would not achieve its outsourcing goals
because expectations would be misaligned and/or misunderstood.
To increase its capacity to select suppliers with an appropriate level of cultural fit, BPX
developed a thorough supplier selection process wherein suppliers were assessed according to
qualities which BPX felt were important : innovation; flexibility; entrepreneurialism (3). BPX
opted to try to reduce the impacts of disputes and litigation by asking its final list of possible
suppliers to develop proposals for alliances for providing seamless service and taking joint
responsibility for services. The requirement that one supplier take primary responsibility for a site
was also designed to deflect the cost of disputes to the suppliers. Very little could be done to
reduce the level of uncertainty of the legal environment (4).
Given the scope and complexity of the outsourcing endeavor, contractual amendments and
contract renegotiation could be very costly (5). In addition to uncertainty (7) and task complexity
(6) discussed earlier, technological discontinuity (6) is an important risk factor, since the contract
involved both computer operations and telecommunications, and because the links between the
two fields are multiplying rapidly.
Several means were put into place that would contribute to alleviate this undesirable
consequence: outsourcing to several suppliers, short term contracts, and a general agreement with
the possibility for each site to indicate its special requirements. The changes would presumably
concern the portfolio of activities for each company (which is less costly to modify) more than
the actual contract structure. The potential costs would then become lower (4). The potential
impacts of technological discontinuity were reduced by minimizing possible change through a
careful assessment of the I/T infrastructure needs before outsourcing and retaining responsibility
for setting standards and guidelines for technology. Overall, the company felt the risk of being
locked into a particular technology was greater than the risk of having to pay for unplanned
future technologies if these would provide value to the company. There was a clear expectation in
the contract that suppliers would work closely with BPX to identify and implement new
technologies. Provided these were valuable to the company, BPX was prepared to pay the
additional costs. Short term contracts was another means of alleviating the effects of
technological discontinuity.
Loss of organizational competencies had a potentially high impact (5). BPX perceived human
resources issues as being a major element in determining the success of this contract. The
company wanted to retain good people so that needed I/T skills would not be lost. Loss of
innovative capacity was considered the biggest potential loss resulting from moving so many
staff out of the organization. This would probably mean that important chunks of knowledge
would disappear from the firm. The related risk factors – scope, proximity to core competencies,
interdependence of activities – were all relatively high. As mentioned earlier, the scope of the
project was large (6). BPX had decided to become a knowledge organization and the
management of information, and consequently IT activities were close to core competencies (6).
The very nature of the outsourced activities is an indication of a high level of interdependence
(6).
7To reduce the loss of expertise, BPX evaluated all staff prior to the transition and retained those
whose skills it needed. It also negotiated that current IT staff would be hired by the suppliers to
provide continuous service over the transition period. The loss of innovative capacity was a
difficult element to manage. BPX recognized that no one supplier could excel in all areas and that
none had access to all the high-quality technologies and services available in the marketplace.
With a single supplier, the company would therefore become linked to the quality of that
supplier’s skills, management, technology and service know-how. Again, the consortium was the
means whereby BPX could reduce this risk because several suppliers would give access to a
broader array of innovative services than a single supplier. However, no supplier would have the
big picture of the industry and the technology portfolio. This potential negative consequence can
only be imperfectly reduced.
Service debasement could materialize in three different ways : slowdown of service, poor
problem resolution, and decline in supplier staff skills ; it was perceived as serious (5). The
associated risk factors are lack of expertise of the supplier with the activity, task complexity,
measurement problems, interdependence of the activities, supplier financial stability, and supplier
size. The first four factors were described earlier. Supplier financial stability was a selection
criterion and was considered prerequisite to becoming a potential BPX supplier. The probability
of choosing an unstable supplier was moderate at the beginning (4). The selection process
lowered this risk by thoroughly evaluating supplier finances and rejecting unstable candidates (2).
The selection process invited both large and small providers to participate and the probability of
selecting a smaller firm was moderate (4).
In this case, the main risk management tool was "not to rely on a single supplier. Having an
alliance deflected the impact of a service slowdown by spreading services between three
companies and mitigated it by keeping suppliers conscious of the company’s ability to switch to
another supplier. In order to mitigate the interdependent character of the activities, BPX decided
to assign clear area of responsibilities. The company tried to mitigate the risk factor by requiring
one supplier to take primary responsibility for problem-solving at each site (3).
BPCC Contract.
In June 1992, the BP Corporate Center (BPCC) undertook the complete outsourcing of its data
center management and of its telecommunications. The implementation of this strategy took nine
months and involved negotiations with three suppliers: two for site services and one for WAN
services. The outsourcing agreement also covered some computing for each of BP’s business
groups. But unlike the BPX project, the BPCC project did not cover application development and
support.
BPCC wished to replicate the distribution of client-supplier responsibilities it had implemented in
the BPX contract. And even as the management at BPCC stated formally it aimed at building a
partnership with its suppliers, a detailed examination of the contract design and management
leads one to conclude that it ended up with mostly a facilities management relationship, which is
fairly common in IT outsourcing.
8Figure 2 BPCC Contract
Risk assessment and management of the BPCC contract was greatly facilitated by the experience
acquired in the BPX contract. Although these were separate units, the BPCC team worked closely
with the BPX team: many of the decisions and directions taken by the BPCC team reflected BPX
ideas and experience. It is not surprising, then, that the final BPCC contract resembled the XIT
contract.
Risk exposure and risk management. Because many risk factors were deemed by the BPCC
team to be present, and the expected consequences rather important, the risk exposure of the
BPCC contract was globally high. Yet, as will be seen, the overall level of risk exposure in the
end was markedly lower than in the BPX contract. The characteristics of the project. The way it
was managed, and the learning that occurred through the BPX contract are responsible for that.
The undesirable outcomes that were identified as both rather costly and highly probable are four:
i) cost escalation; ii) quality debasement; iii) hidden costs; and iv) unexpected management and
transition costs. This made for a rather high global risk exposure of the overall BPCC project (see
Figure 2).
Cost escalation was seen et the outset as a major source of loss (6). It was expected to be likely
mainly because of measurement problems (initially evaluated as very high, 6, and managed to a
moderate-high level,5). First, legal restrictions prevented BP from implementing end-to-end
service level agreements. This created a room for supplier opportunism which led to significant
difficulties. For instance, BP found that there were instances when suppliers marked up the cost
of equipment required by the project. Second, the relative lack of contract management
experience, which was felt to be a serious problem (6) at BPCC made BP more vulnerable to
supplier opportunism. As was indicated above, the management at BPCC knew that this
inexperience represented a major threat and reacted by observing, consulting, and to some extent
implicating the BPX team, thus considerably reducing the probability of undesirable
consequences (1).
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9BPCC’s team had one full time member: the project manager. This person had closed ties to the
XIT’s management and was keen to learn from BPX’s experience. All the other members of the
team were from the BPCC Corporate Information and Telecommunications (CIT) Department
and had responsibilities for the normal operations of CIT. The team recognized early on that it
had very little experience or knowledge of outsourcing. It thus thoroughly reviewed the BPX
process and undertook a systematic benefits and risk analysis of the BPCC project. It also worked
closely wit the BPX team to learn from their experience. Finally, to negotiate from a position of
knowledge, it decided to benchmark existing IT services over a six-month period prior to the
negotiation.
Also to counter the undesirable consequences of cost escalation, the contract focused on precise
cost targets. A reduction of costs was the principal objective of the operation. Cost reductions
thus superseded all other outsourcing goals and became immediately the suppliers’ primary
concern. Some incentives were also provided to suppliers to find ways to further reduce costs.
And, as in the BPX contract, the BPCC strategy involved dealing with a consortium of suppliers,
thus putting each in competition with the others, and alleviating the measurement problems by
introducing a form of benchmarking.
Service debasement, as with the BPX contract, was considered the greatest threat after cost
escalation ex ante (5). A senior executive at BPCC found that 65% of users felt that the quality of
IT services had declined since outsourcing. Here again, measurement problems are the principal
source of risk. For instance, as time passed and the set targets had been met, BP ceased to be seen
as a “preferred customer” and the quality of the personnel assigned to the BPCC contract was felt
to be inadequate or deteriorating. Lack of expertise of the supplier, always a potential factor, was
evaluated as being less important than in the BPX contract because the BPCC contract was more
focused and required a narrower breadth of know how from the supplier, and because of the
experience gained in the supplier selection process by the BPX management team (1). Another
risk factor associated with quality debasement is the level of interdependence between the
outsourced activities and those kept in-house. Since the contract involved telecommunications
links and data centers, interdependence was initially seen as being less than in the BPX contract
(4). Yet, problems linked to the interdependence of the activities develop. For example, if one
supplier needed something from another, he would issue a request and wait for a reply, secure in
the knowledge that he had lived up to his responsibilities: a slowdown of operations would ensue.
Poor problem resolution also appeared as a result of a decline in communication between the
users and the service providers on the one hand, and a decline in supplier staff skills on the other
hand. Interdependence was dealt with as in the BPX contract (thus reducing the the score of that
factor to 2).
In addition, an unintended consequence of the focus on costs reduction was a reduction in the
level or quality of effort of the suppliers leading to service debasement, or to a lack of attention to
proper service improvements. As a result, when the BPCC staff became aware of the risk of a
decline in quality, it increased its monitoring and the staff stayed closer to the projects, thus
increasing the costs of managing the transaction. As a result, the level of undesirable
consequences associated with service debasement was brought down, but only marginally so (4).
10
The presence of hidden service costs –when the client assumes that many services are in the
contract but finds they are not-- was also considered rather likely, and potentially damaging (4),
but much less so than in the BPX contract: both the level of uncertainty and the complexity of the
task were considered much less important in the BPCC context. The level of uncertainty
concerning the needs was considered the prime factor leading to hidden costs (3), yet it was felt
to be lower given the nature and the scope of the activities being outsourced. But measurement
problems (7), which were also considered serious in the BPCC contract combined with moderate
uncertainty to make hidden costs a threat. In the end, little could be done to alleviate that source
of loss (4).
Finally, unexpected management and transition costs (3) were also identified as a potential source
of damages to BP, particularly since BPX had experienced some problems in the transition phase
of the project. But the BPCC team was aware of the transition difficulties encountered during the
BPX contract. It thus developed a coherent human resources plan which addressed the problems
of moved or transferred employees. This resulted in comprehensive and detailed planning.
Contract renegotiations costs (3), disputes and litigations (4), supplier switching costs (2), and
loss of organizational competencies (1) were also considered as potential threats. But the level of
undesirable consequences attached to these, combined with a lower probability of occurrence
produced a lower level of risk exposure.
Thus, learning from BP’s prior experience with outsourcing, comprehensive planning, specifying
precise and hard costs targets, and increased monitoring were the main tools deployed by the
BPCC management team to manage IT outsourcing risks.
BP Global contract.
In 1998, BP decided that a single supplier would replace the fragmented assortment of suppliers
which existed, regrouping all infrastructure and the different contracts (BPX and BPCC). In the
arrangement, the supplier would provide similar IT environments in all the regions where BP
operates. A five year contract was envisaged.
Risk exposure and risk management. The risk level is presented in Figure 3. Two evaluations
were done, one evaluating the ex ante risk, and a second one evaluating the final risk level, once
the risk management mechanisms are implemented. From Figure 3, one can observe that the
riskiest aspect is linked to switching costs. By using only one supplier, a costly lock-in situation
can easily appear. Considering the extent of activities included in the contract, this would be
extremely costly (7). The factors associated to this negative consequence are also significant. The
diversity of material, the size and the inherent complexity of such global operations made the
assets moderately specific (4). This was made apparent by the very small number of suppliers
available. BP evaluated that only two suppliers in the world were capable of providing services
on such a scale (rating = 6). The contract is huge (7) but the activities included in the contract are
moderately interdependent with the rest of BP’s activities (4). To reduce potential problems due
to the lock-in situation, BP included a one-year notice of termination. One year is considered the
minimum time it would take to transfer the contract. This was a major source of disagreement
11
with the supplier but BP considered it too important to give up this clause. This helped reduce the
impact of negative outcome from 7 to 4.
Other elements where potential negative consequences are high are cost escalation and transition
costs. BP’s approach toward the cost aspects is not the same as it was in earlier contracts. While
in its earlier contracts, BP had tried to squeeze out costs, actually reducing the cost of services
over time, with this contract, costs have been defined for five years. This effectively ensures that
everyone knows what their costs will be over this period of time. This is considered a “step back”
in control over this aspect of the contract but the company realized it had pushed its suppliers too
hard in previous contracts. The current contract defines the commercial structure, reporting
requirements, metrics and quality incentives that will be used for this contract. Due to the extent
of services rendered, costs are important and escalation would be very costly. The factors linked
to cost escalation are numerous but many are very low. BP has an extensive expertise and
experience with outsourcing (1), the supplier is very experienced with the activities included in
the contract, being one of the largest in the world. The supplier is also one of the largest
outsourcer in the world. It is very competent in managing contractual relationships (1). The most
threatening factor is the presence of measurement problems. Because of the scope and the variety
of activities, measuring each one will be arduous (5). Many mechanisms were established to
reduce this problem. Among the most important one is the opting out clause, which prevents the
extra costs to be extracted over a long period (revised level: 4).
To reduce measurement problems, benchmarking will be conduced on a regular basis.
Measurement will be done at two levels: global measures specify a set of global metrics, targets,
and common global processes which will be established and measured for such processes as:
problem management, infrastructure change control, messaging management, server
management, and client (PC) management. Service levels will be described in customer-facing
terms. Local Measures will be locally selected from a “service line menu”. Ten metrics have been
identified and regions will be allowed to pick any three of these to be measured. These enable
regions to monitor their “hot buttons”, i.e., the areas which are causing them the most concern.
Measures used will stress standardization across the company to help ensure consistent
governance (revised level:2).
Transition costs could also bring severe penalties (6)due to the extent of the activities to transfer.
They would come with service deterioration and business disruption. Such disruption would
cause severe problems and major losses would be incurred. In fact, some people interviewed
believed that some problems were was already occurring. Kevin Carr noted that key supplier staff
no longer want to work on the BP account because it isn’t going to benefit their careers. There is
also friction with existing suppliers because they believe EDS will try to hire some of these staff
away from them. And several supplier staff have simply resigned in the weeks following the EDS
announcement. The most important factors linked to transition costs are linked to the legal
environment. Transferring activities to EDS presents different risks in different regulatory
situations (4). Even if the contract is understood as global by the partners, conducting business in
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different countries increases the complexity of the legal environment. However, BP has extensive
experience with outsourcing (1) and a thorough of the activities involved (1). To reduce the
transition related problems, BP increased the planning efforts, developing an “exit strategy” for
all suppliers which will clarify their responsibilities and the timing of the changeover. Other ways
of reducing this risk factor include: clear planning and communication; doing one
implementation at a time; development of a phased transition plan with clear accountabilities;
providing incentives to suppliers and key staff; contingency planning; using additional resources;
and good relationship management with all suppliers. In this way, unexpected transition costs
should be reduced (3). Interestingly, the overall cost of transition is not necessarily reduced, but
the unexpected part of it is.
Hidden costs were deemed significant but limited by contract design (4) since most costs will be
bundled into one single cost per month. Some factors leading to such costs were important. The
needs are relatively certain (3), however measurement problems were substantial (5) but, as
discussed earlier, the contract reduced them significantly (2). The services are also relatively
complex (4) but this complexity is mostly transferred to the supplier, leaving to him the micro-
management task. This reduced the complexity on the client side (2). Reduction of quality would
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be very damageable for BP. Most BP activities relied on IT (5). Most drivers of service
debasement are moderate. The supplier is large (1), very experience with the activities (1) and
with outsourcing (1). The activities, involving operations but excluding software development are
somewhat complex (4), fairly interdependent with the rest of the firm’s activities (4), and linked
to core competencies (4). As mentioned earlier, the complexity, for the client, was reduced and
transferred to the supplier (2). Measurement problems were initially high (5) but reduced in the
final setting (2). The supplier had unstable financial situation (5) but further assessment clarified
this situation (3).
The last elements which presents significant risk are contractual amendments and litigation. The
first could be costly (4) simply because of the scope of the agreement. Technological
discontinuity are expected (7), work is complex (4) and uncertainty is present (3). To reduce the
impact of these changes to contracts, BP is managing the risk in two ways. First, some upgrades
have been built into the existing contract and EDS will be responsible for making some
investments in technology improvements. Second, in order to better control its own costs, BP and
EDS have agreed that most technology replacement will be handled in a separate contract. This
will enable BP to see exactly what it is paying for. Jorge Arceniegas noted that clear measures
which are comparable over time are the best ways to control costs. This is perceived as a
sequential contracting mechanism. Litigation would be costly (3). Key drivers of litigation were
cultural fit of the partners (4) legal environment (4) and measurement problems (initial: 5, final:
2). Not much could be done for legal environment. To lower the likelihood of problems in the
area of cultural fit, BP asked suppliers, during the supplier selection process, for references from
other customers and went out to see how they worked with these other companies. Some of the
things they were looking for was: could they tell who was a supplier and who was a client staff
member; how much freedom to act supplier staff had; and their degree of innovation on the job.
This enabled BP to assess to what extent EDS would be able to adjust to BP's culture (final
evaluation: 1).
5. Analysis
We first discuss the micro-structure of the three cases, then compare the strategy used in each
case to deal with outsourcing risks.
As is generally expected from a case study approach, the detailed analysis of the three cases
shows that every contract has its peculiarities, every contract –though conducted within the same
organization- presents different threats and opportunities. Yet, the BPX and BPCC contracts
show many similarities and interconnections.
In both cases, the most feared undesirable consequences are cost escalation, hidden service costs
and service debasement. And in both cases, measurement problems appear to be the most serious
related factor of risk. Yet the BPX contract is characterized by both a rather high level of
undesirable consequences and a high probability of occurrence. This is attributable to the scope
and characteristics of the BPX contract: it covered all BP exploration activities around the globe
and covered systems development, in addition to date center management, telecommunications
14
and maintenance. Hence the scores associated to the transaction-specific risk factors: uncertainty,
measurement problems, task complexity, asset specificity, etc. Of a more limited scope, both
spatially and functionally, the BPCC contract is clearly a much less risky endeavor.
In addition, as the above analysis of each case has suggested, learning occurred through the
management of the BPX contract, which translated into both lower probabilities for the
undesirable consequences and better risk management strategies. The mean value of the ex ante
probability of occurrence of all undesirable consequences falls from 5.1 to 3.4 when one moves
from the BPX to the BPCC contract. The ex post probability falls from 3.6 to 2.5.This is suggests
two things: the BPX team was rather successful in bringing down the probability of a major
mishap in managing the BPX contract, and this experience helped the BPCC team, in particular
in the planning, assessment and strategy phase of the project. An indication of that is the score
associated with the lack of expertise factor in the BPCC case, which drops (ex ante) from 6 to 1,
mainly because of learning.
On the other hand, the Global BP contract appears to present undesirable consequences similar to
those in the BPX contract, thus larger than in the BPCC contract, but with a lower probability of
occurrence. Although the scale of activities in the BP Global contract is quite impressive, its
scope is narrower than in the BPX case, for it excludes development. It also contains one
distinguishing features: it relies on a single supplier. This can be seen as a technological
constraint dictated by the desire to provide similar IT environments everywhere. This
characteristic explains why the dominant fear, in the BP Global context, was that of being
“locked in” with that supplier. Thus the prevalence of switching costs and transition and
management costs.
When comparing the global management strategies used in all three contexts, we clearly see that
efforts were directed at reducing the very high probability that a major problem would develop
(such as cost overruns or hidden service costs) in the BPX contract, whereas in the BP Global
contract, most efforts were directed at reducing the losses.
This should not come as a surprise: the overall probability of losses was significantly higher in
the former case (5.1 compared to 3.8), with comparable (average) loss levels (5.1 versus 4.9).
Hence a strategy aimed at reducing that probability would bring greater benefit. There are reasons
to believe that the marginal cost of reducing the probability of an undesirable consequence
increases rapidly as this probability is reduced: thus targeting the high probability consequences
and trying to have an impact on the underlying factors makes sense. Likewise, the BP Global
team started off with moderate probabilities of facing undesirable consequences. Yet, some
undesirable outcomes entailed potentially very heavy losses: the strategy adopted in this case
aimed principally at reducing the magnitude of the losses. The average loss level was thus
curtailed to 3.5 from an initial level of 4.9. The expected losses arising from switching suppliers
or from unexpected transition costs were quite remarkably cut down by careful planning and
contract design. In comparison, the mean expected loss in the BPX contract was reduced from 5.1
to 4. Notice that risk management also brought down the probability of loss in the BP Global
contract (from 3.8 to 2.9).
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Again, this suggests that the BP management read very clearly the situation and deliberately
sought the least cost alternative to managing risks. Concentrating efforts on the probability side
in the first situation, and on the loss side in the second is coherent with the global evaluation of
the two contracts.
That BP accepted to born the remaining risk only shows that it expected to reap benefits from
those transactions (mainly cost reductions). Whether the expected benefits justified the overall
level of risk borne by the company is beyond the reach of this analysis. It can only be argued that
the objective of outsourcing risk management is to minimize the expected cost associated with
the contractual risks of an outsourcing strategy. These costs are made up of two components: the
expected losses of undesirable consequences and the costs of managing risks. Once a position of
maximum gains is obtained for a given transactional context, it remains to be seen, on a strategic
level, if the remaining risk level is consistent with the (operational) gains that are expected.
If our analysis of those three outsourcing contracts at BP can not tell us if the decision was
efficient in a risk-return framework, it shows that risk management at BP consisted in a very
articulate and deliberate exercise which proved successful in bringing down the global risk
exposure of the company to IT outsourcing risks. Moreover, by following BP through the three
contracts, one is struck by the perfecting of their risk management strategy. Learning does occur,
and is put to use in the management of future contracts.
6. Conclusion
Our analysis illustrates that each IT outsourcing contract gives rise to different manifestations of
risk. The sources of risk (factors), and their prevalence, are equally context dependent. This
diversity should lead managers to adopt different risk management strategies, depending on the
context (here defined as the characteristics of the client and the supplier and the transaction-
specific characteristics). The findings of this study corroborate this assertion: in some situations,
the strategy aimed at reducing the probability of occurrence of undesirable consequences, in
others, it focused on lowering the impact of the potential undesirable consequences. And,
sometimes, it tried to accomplish both.
The results support the risk analysis framework. First, all three contracts could be described in
terms of negative events faced by the client and relative likelihood for each event. This likelihood
of each event was approximated using associated factors. Such a description directly suggests
corresponding management mechanisms, usually taking the form of contractual mechanisms, to
reduce the risk level.
BP appears to be a particularly interesting organization for conducting such an analysis. The firm
has a strong tradition and a rather formal process for dealing with IT risks. As a result, the
attention its managers paid to risk exposure, their experience with risk management in general,
and BP’s organizational routines enabled the firm to undertake very risky IT outsourcing
projects. By properly managing risk, BP managers deliberately chose to bear some risk, while
exerting efforts to maintain their risk exposure within tolerable bounds, given the strategic
objectives of the operation. They thus did not rely on fate and chose to manage risk.
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The case showed that some choices could be seen as compromises. A given risk management
mechanism could lower one type of risk while increasing another one. For example, when BP
decided in the third contract to deal with a single supplier, risks related to measurement problems
were less probable. However, this was done at the expense of an increase in the risk of lock-in.
As managers become more aware of the control they have on the risk profile of their IT
outsourcing strategy, they should bear more responsibility over the outcomes.
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